at the controversy over radicalism and the willingness to resort to violence within the environment of the German workers' movement.
Actually, two studies on the Saxon suffrage movement of 1905-1906 were written in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) during the 1950s. They are disappointing not only because the Dresden demonstrations are dealt with fairly briefly, but also because neither study measures up to the standards of scientific research. In one of them, the author recounts the events surrounding the demonstrations as was reported at the time in the Social Democratic Sdchsische Arbeiterzeitung and spices the original material with several fabricated details. 3 The author of the second study uses other sources, primarily the reports submitted by the' Dresden chief of police to the Saxon Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, as in the first study, the depiction and interpretation of the evidence are teeming with irresolvable contradictions and crude simplifications so typical for much of GDR historiography. In this vein, the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) membership and "the" workers in general are placed on equal footing and depicted as being at the same time extremely disciplined and imbued with radical fervor. All major violent actions, modeled on the first Russian revolution, were prevented solely by the "treason against the working class" committed by "the opportunistic party leadership" in December 1905. 4 Richard Evans, however, has written an undeniably sophisticated analysis of the suffrage unrest that occurred a short time later, namely in January 1906, in Hamburg. 5 Disturbed by crude, quantified research on protest, he has succeeded in producing a methodologically sound and narratively-polished case study on social protest. Evans differentiates between a peaceful demonstration at the square in front of the town hall of the Hanseatic city, in which the participants only resisted sporadically to the police clearance of the square by force, and the later formation of groups, who plundered the shops in the side streets and engaged the police in outright battles across street barricades. He comes to the conclusion that, in addition to the "respectable working classes", there were large and growing militant groups among the lower classes. The unrest that occurred in the winter of 1905-1906 therefore appears to be the direct predecessor to the Revolution of 1918, the only unique aspect of which was the emergence of a "revolutionary leadership" -namely by the Independent Social Democrats. By 1905-1906, argues Evans, "the SPD was losing touch with the potential for militancy of the classes which it claimed to represent, militancy which found expression in frequent outbursts of spontaneous collective protest, both political and industrial'*. 6 Do the events, that occurred in Dresden in December 1905 fit into this interpretation? In order to answer this question, I will first examine the positions and aims of the Social Democratic leadership in the Saxon capital and in Berlin within the context of the general political situation, and I will then analyze the behavior of the demonstrators during the course of events that took place at the rallies on 3 and 16 December.
II
In the early years following the turn of the century, German domestic politics were characterized by a strengthening of the Social Democrats, on the one hand, and by weakness and discord among its opponents, on the other. In 1903 the elections to the Reichstag brought a record increase in votes for the SPD, especially, in Saxony. During the course of the election campaign, which focused chiefly on the debate over the burden that duties and tariffs placed on consumers, the issues of tax and suffrage reform were raised increasingly. 7 Liberals and conservatives became increasingly divided in their opinions on whether the growth of the Social Democratic movement could be countered best by reform or by repression. Membership of the SPD continued to rise rapidly as did that of the free trade unions. An unprecedented wave of strikes swept over Germany. Among the Social Democrats, a debate ensued on the chances of staging demonstrations and political strikes. To some it appeared as if the winds of revolution were beginning to stir. fostering this atmosphere. And at least the Social Democrats in Dresden were even more impressed by the wave of demonstrations that helped their comrades in Austria-Hungary advance the cause of suffrage reform. Close attention was paid to the success of this movement, which climaxed in a series of major rallies in late November attended by a total of nearly a million people throughout the Danube monarchy. It was estimated that 250,000 demonstrated in Vienna alone. 9 We know little about the plans and goals of the SPD executive committee in this period. The months between October 1905 and March 1906 must have been full of hectic activity for the Social Democratic elite a period in which little time was left for reflection and contemplation. For example, the correspondence of August Bebel and Karl Kautsky, which usually provides a great deal of insight into the minds of the leadership practically ceased. And there are large time gaps in the diary entries of Hermann Molkenbuhr, executive committee secretary. 10 Until August 1905, the leading German Social Democrats remained very skeptical of the emerging debate over a mass or general strike. They called political strikes purely defensive weapons that should only be deployed against political attacks on the right to enter coalitions or on general voting rights for the Reichstag. In mid-August, Molkenbuhr even made fun in his diary of "the daydreaming about the general strike".
11 It was therefore quite a sensation when Bebel announced on 22 September at the Social Democratic congress held in Jena that even the aggressive tactic of strikes should be considered in order to force the introduction of universal, equal and secret suffrage in Prussia, Saxony and elsewhere. A resolution to this effect had been approved by the entire executive committee just prior to the party congress and was supported by the majority of the delegates. new course was by no means a signal of a transition by the SPD leadership to "revolutionary positions", as was asserted repeatedly in GDR historiography. 13 At least Bebel, who was at the zenith of his power and prestige and whose influence within the party can hardly be overestimated, clarified unequivocally in a letter to his close friend Victor Adler, chairman of the Austrian Social Democratic party, that he did not agree with those who felt that the political strike would replace completely the legalistic approach practiced by the SPD up to that time.
14 For Bebel, the real arena for political struggle remained the parliaments.
However, the mass strike resolution that passed at the party congress in Jena was not merely a formula for compromise designed exclusively for the purpose of bridging, at least verbally, the enormous gap between the emerging radical left within German Social Democracy and the reformist trade union leadership. 15 If this aspect alone is considered, the SPD inevitably appears to be an internally divided, weak party. Yet it seems fair to assume that the decision to move beyond the earlier, purely defensive concept of political strikes reflects instead a feeling of growing confidence. Despite the poor availability of source material there are indeed indications that the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party hoped the use of strikes or at least the threat of them would bring about political reforms.
This was the gist of the diary entry made by Molkenbuhr on 23 October 1905, in which he described the SPD as in an extremely favorable position and noted that the conservatively dominated Prussian and national governments were close to despair. In a later entry in 1909, Molkenbuhr recalled that he had considered mass strikes to be inevitable in [1905] [1906] . 16 What seemed more appropriate than to use such strikes as a weapon to advance the long-standing aim of political reform? Bebel must have been thinking along these lines when he drastically criticized a proposal put forth by the reformist Wolfgang Heine that the SPD should distance itself from any action not complying with valid law. Referring to this proposal, Bebel said, "we would not This strategy of civil disobedience was a gamble with many unknown variables. For one, it was not clear how the conservative forces controlling government, bureaucracy, army and police would react to the holding of banned open air demonstrations or to political strikes. The same uncertainty existed regarding the behavior of the liberals, who were now hesitantly calling for reforms. Would they again -out of fear of unrest -resort to repression and return to their earlier position as the junior partner of the conservatives? Or would they attempt to convince the conservatives that it would be better to democratize the political system in order to defuse the popular protest? Most of all, the radicalism.at the grass-roots level of the Social Democratic movement was being put to the test. How far were the "common people" prepared to go? In many respects, Saxony was an ideal laboratory for finding the answers to these questions in 1905.
Ill
Since 1896, the kingdom of Saxony had a plutocratic three-class system of franchise like Prussia. Introduced by a coalition of conservatives and liberals, the franchise system had robbed the SPD of the opportunity to establish a significant representation in the kingdom's diet for the foreseeable future. The Saxon Social Democrats blamed the failure to prevent this "franchise robbery" in 1896 on the disinterest of the population. "The masses [. . .] just won't get up in arms," sighed the chairman of the district agitational committee Hermann Fleipner after years of futile efforts. The elections to the diet were not even important enough to the workers "to sacrifice an hour's wages".
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A change in this trend appeared to be heralded by the success of the 1903 Reichstag elections, the surprising election of a Social Democratic candidate to the Saxon diet in 1905, and the unusually high participation in the demonstrations against rising food prices in the autumn of the same year. 20 In addition, the'conservative-liberal alliance was disintegrating. In the 1905 elections to the Saxon diet, the liberals ceased their cooperation with the conservatives in maintaining a decade-long cartel of candidates. In addition to differences over economic policy, the cause for this rift was a difference in opinion over whether reform or repression was the best way to handle the SPD. The liberals now even considered repealing the franchise handicap established in 1896. By increasing public pressure, the SPD leaders hoped to push the liberals down the road of progressive reform: "Now it is the people's turn to speak,'* announced their organ, the Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung.
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At midday on 19 November, Leipzig's city center became the stage for street demonstrations. Throughout all of Saxony, Social Democratic suffrage rallies had taken place that morning indoors. As these ended in Leipzig, the participants streamed into the city center. Led by the SPD Reichstag representative Geyer, they cheered for universal suffrage in front of city hall, the royal district government, and the home of the commanding general. Similar scenes then took place in front of the Russian and Austrian consulates and at various central locations throughout the city. According to estimates made by state authorities, the number of participants in the street demonstrations was somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 people. The police did not intervene, so as to avoid any "tumult". Yet it is obvious that SPD leaders were willing to use "new" means to intensify public pressure. An article appearing on 20 November included the statement "that the mass strike is possible", an assertion that could be read many times in the pages of the paper throughout that autumn. The chairman of the Saxon Social Democrats, Georg Gradnauer, even believed that in the event of a political strike, the working class could count even on the silent approval of liberal entrepreneurs, who were disgruntled with conservative politics in the diet. 24 In the days following the street demonstrations in Leipzig, speakers at SPD rallies in Dresden also called for holding open air demonstrations.
But here the state security forces proved less tolerant. After all, Dresden was the political center of Saxony in two respects: both the royal residency and the seat of the state diet were located there. As police chief Koettig assured the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was not willing "to tolerate agitation spilling into the streets". However, his sources indicated that the local SPD leaders were intending to have their followers do just that. Not only were police informers reporting similar observations from party rallies, 25 but the Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung also printed the following statement on 25 November: "Let us wait to see what the diet will say, yet at the same time, let us prepare to gather again in the streets and at rallies to demonstrate vigorously anew." Two days later, Minister President Metzsch rejected suffrage reform in parliament. The conservative faction in parliament supported his decision, while the liberal representatives remained indecisive.
At this point, the Social Democratic party journal was conspicuously careful not to draw any concrete conclusions from this development. Yet in the days that followed, it reported extensively on the mass demonstration that took place in the streets of Vienna on 28 November and on the ensuing guarantee by the Austrian government that suffrage would be democratized. Concurrently, a call went out again for protest rallies to be held throughout all of Saxony the following Sunday, 3 December. Police Chief Koettig thus summoned the members of the Social Democratic agitational committee for eastern Saxony to police headquarters. He first told them that "he has not been petty in his attitude or actions against Social Democracy, as he has shown during his tenure in office". However, he would not tolerate illegal open air demonstrations and would be "determined to repress" them. Because those summoned, including Fleiflner, were "known to be very influential in the labor movement, he urged them to take notice of this and to exert their influence in order to prevent street demonstrations if such were planned".
The Social Democrats, however, were not about to accept this offer of a "gentlemen's agreement", presented in such a confidential, ingratiat-ing tone. They had already spent an entire day "racking their brains" in order to word a reply which was both cool and careful. They expressed first "their surprise over this notice, since there could be no talk of an organized street demonstration. It would be the business of individual associations and persons to call for any type of Social Democratic meeting. They refused to be held responsible for anything that happened before or after such meetings. Whereas they would accept the information just presented to them for their own personal reference, they were not obligated to the police for anything. In any case, Social Democrats in Dresden had shown that they were not considering organizing anything at all illegal." 26 The opening and closing remarks of this statement reassured the police chief to the point that, as he subsequently stated, he no longer deemed it necessary to ban all meetings as had been originally intended. Yet, in fact, the Social Democratic leaders had washed their hands of all guilt should the approaching rallies erupt into street demonstrations. It. would be wrong to conclude from their statement at police headquarters that they rejected the idea of street demonstrations. 27 Had they then advocated open air demonstrations, they could have counted on being detained on the spot. More likely their behavior reveals that the Social Democrats had long been planning to have street demonstrations follow the indoor meetings.
At their party congress the following year, the leaders of the Saxon Social Democrats even confirmed publicly that they indeed had organized the open air demonstrations. 28 The motives for their denial of involvement immediately before and after 3 December are obvious. They wanted, first and foremost, to avoid criminal prosecution and, second, to prevent an immediate ban of officially organized indoor meetings, as had already been imposed in Leipzig following the events of 19 November. In addition, the SPD leaders probably hoped that by depicting the street demonstrations following their rallies as spontaneous protest by the "people", the impact of this action would be greater on the government and the diet. Therefore, in its editorial and commentary published on 4 December, the Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung referred to the street demonstrations as a "movement born spontaneously from the innermost heart of the masses". The paper stressed just as strongly that not one of the speakers at the indoor rallies had called for street demonstrations. Not one word was written about the content of those speeches, however. 26 This account is based on the extensive description of the meeting published in the SAZ on 2 December 1905, to which Police Chief Koettig also refers in his brief report, dated 3 December, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 27 Although Herrmann, who only quotes the last phrase of the statement, does argue this; "Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrecht in Sachsen", p. 862. 28 Protokoll tiber die Verhandlungen der Landesversammlung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Sachsens (Dresden, 1906), p . 58.
The resolution of the agitational committee that was passed in all of the meetings contained the following sentence: "The people do not appear to be willing to let the matter rest with tedious protests, all of which have gone unheeded so far." 29 This was a barely concealed call to action that placed the responsibility of things to come on the shoulders of the anonymous masses while it exonerated its authors. Evidently, the wording did not receive unanimous support from the Social Democratic leadership. One of the seven people addressing the rallies, Julius FrafJdorf -a man known to be on the far right wing of the Saxon party leadership -considered street demonstrations to be too dangerous and "tedious protests*' sufficient. Anyone who ventured out to Cotta, a community located on the far west side of Dresden, at noon on 3 December to hear FrSpdorf speak, was urged by him "to go home quietly". 30 And this is precisely what his audience did, in contrast to the participants of the other six rallies.
At these meetings, the speakers cleverly disguised their calls for street demonstrations while adroitly teetering on the edge of illegality. Fleipner for example was reported as saying that "with regard to the events in Austria, he fully trusted the working class of Dresden to do the right thing at the right moment if it did not want to sacrifice its reputation as the avant-garde of Germany's modern working class". 31 Gradnauer reported on 6 December on the speakers' tactics. In his words, they urgently called attention to the warnings issued by police headquarters that the police would intervene ruthlessly against street marches. But the working masses understood that it was the job of the leaders to warn and their job to throw these warnings to the wind. As the author of these lines stood before one of the rallies calling for levelheadedness and advising against the use of violence, he was answered with general approval. Yet when he pointed out that the 29 The following is the entire text as it appeared in the SAZ on 4 December 1905: "In the name of the entire people of Saxony, the meeting proclaims that the recent rejection of suffrage reform, which the public has so urgently demanded, by the Saxon government and the majority of the second chamber of parliament constitutes an incomprehensible disregard of the people's will; that the bitterness, especially of working class people, has reached its peak; and that the Saxon government and parliament are solely responsible for the consequences arising from this indignation. The people do not appear to be willing to let the matter rest with tedious protests, all of which have gone unheeded so far. The threat of police repression of suffrage demonstrations is not considered by the meeting to be an appropriate measure to placate the people. All that can help and reassure are immediate election reform and free suffrage as demanded by Social Democracy. This reform is being demanded again with utmost urgency and implacability. people of a civilized country should not be denied its right to its own city streets, he was answered with the jubilant roar from the crowd of a thousand. 32 
IV
If the Dresden police chief had any doubts before noon on 3 December that the Social Democrats were planning coordinated street demonstrations, these doubts must have been completely dashed by what happened following the conclusion of the indoor meetings at noon. Instead of dispersing outside the meeting halls and going for strolls to popular excursion places in the city's outlying areas as they would have done on any other Sunday, the participants closed ranks and marched the most direct route toward the heart of the city. The police forces, which had been placed on alert as a precaution, quickly attempted to block off all access to the city center.
Coming from all directions simultaneously, the marchers all apparently intended to gather first at the Altmarkt. The behavior of the demonstrators after this indicates that they had then planned to proceed to the SchloPplatz, in order to protest against the existing suffrage in front of the royal palace and the diet. The police chief noted in his report to the internal affairs ministry that "in light of the well-executed march on the city center, it can be assumed with near certainty that a type of watchword was given from the central authority, even if the workers' leaders would have been careful enough to have used less well-known comrades".
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What little information there is about the departure of each group from the various meeting places reinforces the impression that this was indeed a planned action, in which the groups would meet in the city center. Just over half a kilometer west from Zwinger, two Social Democratic rallies had taken place not far from one another. As the meeting held in the Volkshaus (People's Hall) in RitzenbergstraPe ended, several people in the middle of the crowd yelled, "Everyone to Schiitzenplatz!" That was where the second meeting was being held in a hall called the Trianon, and the crowd from the Volkshaus meeting waited in the square for the other session to end. A police informer reported hearing one participant say to another: "They should be coming soon." Once the rally in the Trianon ended, both groups marched together toward the city center. In the east, in what was known as the BlumensMle (Flower Halls), many began to cry out at the end of Gradnauer's speech,
194
Christoph Nonn "Off to the Altmarkt!" 34 Participants from the indoor meetings, both in the community of Lobtau south-west of town, where FleifSner spoke, and from the dance hall in the new town north of the Elbe river, headed toward the city. Only those listening to Frapdorf in Cotta apparently followed his advice and went home. From Pieschen, a place on the other side of the Elbe quite a distance north-west of Dresden, the participants from the meeting held there began their march on the city without a word being uttered.
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Taken together, the meeting places could hold nearly 15,000 people, and on this day they were bursting. Many people arrived too late to find a place inside the halls, so they waited in front of the doors or in pubs nearby. Once the rallies were over, these people joined the marching demonstrators. Since the groups could not meet at the Altmarkt as planned because of police barriers, it was difficult to guess the number of participants and the police report did not even include an estimate. The Social Democratic press spoke of up to 80,000 people, which is probably an exaggerated figure. Other newspapers reported figures between 25,000 and 40,000. Compared to the population of Dresden, which equaled half a million in 1905, these figures did not represent an overwhelmingly large crowd. However, it should not be overlooked that women apparently did not take part in the demonstration, or only in very small numbers. At least there was no mention made of women attending these rallies, unlike those that had taken place indoors on 18 November, and the Sdchsische Arbeiterzeitung at one point in its account even referred explicitly to the "closed ranks of men". Perhaps the absence of women can be explained by the fear of violent confrontation with the police. It would then be a further indication that the demonstrations had been planned long beforehand.
Since children and the elderly can be excluded from the potential pool of demonstrators -like women -then somewhere between a sixth and a quarter of the adult male population of Dresden, depending on the estimate involved, heeded the SPD's call to take to the streets on 3 December 1905. At first glance, it thus appears as if the SPD significantly missed its mark in claiming to protest the existing suffrage laws "in the name of the entire people of Saxony". 36 Compared to the number of voters who had turned out for the last elections to the national parliament, a total of between 25,000 and 40,000 demonstrators also does not seem particularly large. After all, nearly 84,000 Dresden voters had cast their ballots for the SPD in 1903. 37 However, the Social Democratic party leaders themselves repeatedly mentioned that the police 34 Ibid., ff. 17, 19. M A s reported in the SAZ. 36 As was stated in the text of the resolution, see note 29. 37 chief had threatened to use any means necessary to repress street demonstrations. The triumphant tone expressed in the party press the next morning to report on the large number of participants that came despite these threats indicates that the leaders had wanted to test how many and how dedicated the hard-core party supporters were. Seen in this light, it was indeed quite an accomplishment for the SPD to mobilize two to three times as many people as it had members in the Saxon capital. 38 Since violent confrontations with the police could not be ruled out, it took a good measure of courage to take part in the demonstration. Soon these people were forced to show just how much courage was needed, since the police chief made good on his threat to be relentless in his repression of the street demonstrations.
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On their way to the city center, the marching groups of demonstrators soon ran up against small contingents of police, which either retreated or let the demonstrators pass. On the west side of the city, the groups from the Volkshaus and the Trianon met those who had attended the Lobtau rally in Wettinerstrape. Yet once they arrived at Postplatz, their way to the Altmarkt was blocked by the entire regiment of mounted gendarmerie and a larger detachment of the civic guard. The demonstrators then turned south in the direction of the Alleenring, an avenue that encircled the city center, and attempted to reach the heart of the city through the side streets. These too were blocked. At about the same time, the people who had been attending the rally in the BlumensSle arrived from the east via Amalienplatz until they reached the Neumarkt, where they were surrounded by police. After a part of the group failed in its attempt to break through to the diet, located on Schlopplatz, the gendarmerie opened up a passageway through Moritzstrape, allowing these demonstrators also to retreat south to the Alleenring.
The police had not been forced to use their weapons during the confrontation with demonstrators either at the Neumarkt or at Postplatz. But they did in the north of Dresden. The marchers from Pieschen and the new town had to cross the Elbe in order to reach the city center. The two groups met at the Augustus Bridge. 40 A contingent of gendarm-38 According to ibid., p . 314, the number o f S P D members in the three Dresden Reichstag electoral districts in 1905 equaled 12,855. 39 T h e following is based primarily o n the eyewitness accounts published in the SAZ and DA on 4 December 1905 and on the report of the police chief to the minister of internal affairs on 3 December, HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, ff. 17-20. All three sources concur basically, and sometimes they supplement each other; differences in these accounts will be indicated. The accounts appearing in other papers on 4 December only contained additional details on the climate. The content of later newspaper reports is mostly worthless for reconstructing the course of events since these reports are chiefly personal recollections exhibiting obvious tendencies toward myth-building. 40 Just before these two groups met, there had been a confrontation at the Marien Bridge between the marchers from Pieschen and the gendarmerie. According to the account erie was posted at the bridgehead on the new town side north of the river, but allowed a small part of the crowd to push it aside. 41 The demonstrators streamed across the 400-meter-long bridge toward the facades of the parliament building, the court church, and the palace. SchloPplatz, which lay directly at the foot of the bridge, was the central neural point for the city center. Another unit of gendarmes was posted there. According to the detailed account given in the police report, this unit, under the command of a police officer, faced the crowd and brought it to a standstill. Several demands to go back were ignored; after about two minutes, the call suddenly rang out, "Break through! Forwards!" The crowd grabbed several policemen, pushed them aside and attempted to break through the police cordon with force. In this instant, the police officer gave [. . .] the order to draw swords and use force. Once swords were drawn, several persons from the crowd attacked with sticks and fists. Jeering was heard, such as "bloodhounds", "throw the dogs in the Elbe", "Cossacks". Yet they succeeded in pushing the crowd little by little back over the bridge.
It is striking that the crowd hesitated before storming the police cordon, especially since this crowd consisted of the more militant minority of the demonstrators who had already broken through the barriers on the new town side of the bridge moments before, leaving the majority behind them. Yet things were different now. It could be anticipated that the gendarmes on the other side would probably draw their arms in order to prevent a breakthrough, since the medical corps were waiting on SchloPplatz just behind the police cordon on the bridgehead. 42 With their goal in sight, several demonstrators decided nevertheless to test the waters. Since the crowd reacted with cries of "Cossacks!" once the police had barred their swords, as the Sticfisische Arbeiterzeitung confirmed in its significantly shorter account, 43 the demonstrators were obviously viewing the situation as a replay of events in Russia. Yet their subsequent behavior shows that most of them were not willing to battle with security forces. appearing in the SAZ, 400 demonstrators broke through the police barrier; however, the police report states that "their attempt to cross the Marien Bridge was thwarted, upon which they moved on toward the Augustus Bridge". Both sources concurred that no blood was spilled at the confrontations here. It is possible that the police report failed to mention the breakthrough of the 400 demonstrators because the number involved seemed insignificant compared to the entire crowd of 4-5,000 -as estimated by the SAZ -and because this group was then stopped at Postplatz. It is also possible that the police wanted to prevent the crowd from proceeding along the north side of the river bank at all and that a small group of demonstrators did break through the barriers while the rest took a detour to the Augustus Bridge.A "terrible jostling" then occurred in the middle of the bridge during which several people were knocked out 44 as the front rows of the demonstrators attempted to turn round while the back rows could not yet see what was going on. In the front rows, the people probably used walking canes to protect themselves from the threatening blades of the police swords. It seems very unrealistic to assume that the demonstrators still attempted to forcibly break through the police cordon once the officers had drawn their swords, as the police report contends. The Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung was not the only newspaper emphatically to deny this contention by the police. The morning after the events, the liberal Dresdner Zeitung, which was an unpartisan observer of the conflict, also summarized its eyewitness reports as follows:
Although there were some incidents of violence and boorishness, which comes as no.surprise at such a mass demonstration, in general it should be stressed that the manifestants [. . .] everywhere maintained order and limited themselves to passive resistance.
These statements also seem to be supported by the subsequent behavior of the demonstrators at the Augustus Bridge. Once the demonstrators had turned back from the old town bridgehead, the commanding officer ordered his men to sheathe their swords. According to the police report, "this immediately prompted cries from the crowd to charge again". However, these few voices were not echoed. "All that occurred were the catcalls, a second charge did not follow." Once the police had shown its resolve to use any means necessary in order to prevent a demonstration from taking place on Schlopplatz, the crowd gave up, with the exception of a few individuals. It returned to the new town side of the river and proceeded to the Carola Bridge, only to discover that it was also blocked. The gendarmes here were not forced to resort to arms. The demonstrators merely shouted insults and then dispersed.
In the meantime, several hundred demonstrators on the other bank of the Elbe river had succeeded by one o'clock in reaching the Altmarkt by hopping on streetcars before transportation broke down completely because of the shifting of the crowds along the Alleenring. Perhaps some of the police forming the cordons in the streets leading into the old town were therefore withdrawn. In any case, other small groups of demonstrators forced their way from the Alleenring to the city center shortly afterwards and via the Altmarkt they reached Schlopplatz. The police posted there were pushed to the periphery of the square by the masses. 45 Police demands for dispersal were drowned out by the sound of the socialist march being sung by demonstrators. Then the police drew their swords. According to the police report, the security forces succeeded "in pushing back the crowd shortly thereafter and in clearing the square", as they had previously cleared the Augustus Bridge. The Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung confirmed these statements while adding that the people "could not retreat fast enough".
In the two hours that followed, police and smaller groups of demonstrators played cat-and-mouse in the streets and squares of the old town. Most of the thousands gathered that day, who had not succeeded in reaching the city center, spent their time on the Biirgerwiesen located south of the city cheering for equal suffrage. Finally the cry reverberated throughout the crowd to "march on Minister Metzsch!". A rally in front of the home of the hated minister, who had announced in parliament shortly before that the government would not yield in the matter of suffrage reform, seemed like an appropriate substitute for the thwarted demonstration at Schlopplatz. The crowd began to move toward Metzsch's villa near the central train station. On Wienerstra|3e, a large police unit started to chase the crowd, causing the demonstrators to break into a run. They stopped in front of the villa, but immediately continued to move on before the sword-brandishing police could catch up with them.
After this, the crowd began to diminish noticeably. Part of it turned northward again. Finally, a group of hard-core demonstrators numbering between "well over a thousand" 46 and "three thousand" 47 headed toward the city center again and reached Pirnaischer Platz on the Alleenring by 1.45 p.m. This time they attempted forcibly to break through the police cordon here in order to gain access to the city center. 48 As the commanding officer ordered his troops to draw their swords, the attempted breakthrough quickly turned into a hasty retreat. In order to save themselves from sword blows, many demonstrators climbed on top of the numerous streetcars that were standing there because the commotion had prevented them from proceeding along the Alleenring. The police eventually pulled back, their commanding officer ordered the crowd three times to disperse. Finally, the crowd broke up.
The situation on Pirnaischer Platz repeated what had occurred both at Augustus Bridge and at Schlopplatz; people began to leave following the initial use of police force. In all three cases, those who even attempted to break through the police cordons represented a militant minority of demonstrators numbering several hundred at Schlopplatz, approximately the same at Augustus Bridge, and as many as 3,000 at Pirnaischer Platz. Most of the 25,000 demonstrators, by contrast, followed the strategy of avoiding confrontation. Instead of attempting to break through the barricades, they spread themselves out along the Alleenring. As the opportunity arose, small groups would slip through breaks in the barricades, assemble at a square chanting their demands for equal suffrage, and then disappear in the narrow side streets of the old town once the police arrived, only to re-emerge at one of the many other squares. This game of cat-and-mouse continued until 3.30 in the afternoon, three and a half hours after the beginning of the street demonstrations.
The events of 3 December remained the talk of the town for days in Dresden. Liberal press and parliamentary party criticized the Social Democrats for threatening to escalate their suffrage campaign through demonstrations and even mass strikes. Yet unlike the conservatives, the liberals also criticized the police for using armed force and now announced unequivocal support for suffrage reform as a means of defusing the situation. 49 On 14 December, Minister President Metzsch declared in parliament that his government was perhaps willing to support a reform initiative if the SPD would forgo the street demonstrations and threats of a political strike.
Because the party did indeed distance itself from demonstrations and strikes, even though the government's declaration was rather vague, most of the Social Democratic leaders were accused of "opportunism". Yet, in reality, what happened in the diet could not have been the primary cause for the SPD stance. Most of the party's leadership had already rejected the idea of political strikes and additional public demonstrations beforehand, almost a week before Metzsch's speech, in the period shortly after the demonstration. On 8 December, it could be read in the Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung that a mass strike was a weapon to be used only with a great deal of careful, long-term preparation, if ever. At the same time, Fleipner unequivocally reassured the mayor, who was deeply concerned about the Christmas business of the city's small retailers, that "the Social Democrats in Dresden currently are not thinking about organizing street demonstrations". by the police. On the other hand, the great mass of demonstrators had shown no revolutionary militancy but a considerable amount of civil courage, thereby prompting the wavering liberals finally to advocate the long-sought suffrage reform more indisputably than ever before. Thus, the real goal appeared to have been reached, making any further "Austrian-" or even "Russiantalk" unnecessary, if not even contraproductive in light of the criticism leveled by the liberals. When Metzsch then signaled that the government was perhaps ready to make some concessions -which did actually lead to a reform in 1909 that earned the SPD about a third of the mandates in the Saxon diet -this development only further convinced most Social Democratic leaders that the strategy they had been favoring was the right one.
Suffrage rallies were announced again for 16 December. But whereas before the rallies on 3 December the Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung had only published the warning of the police chief against holding open air demonstrations and the ambiguous answer of the agitational committee to this warning, this time the paper emphasized "that street demonstrations were not to take place -not because the police and government have forbidden them, but because we consider them unsuitable for the time being". 51 The speakers reiterated this position at the meetings held on the sixteenth, and as a precautionary measure, these meetings did not even start until nine o'clock in the evening. Instead of implicitly calling for action, five of the seven people addressing these meetings explicitly advised against holding street demonstrations. In Lobtau, the speaker was somewhat ambivalent in calling on his audience to "continue the struggle". However, he nevertheless emphasized that any further action could be taken only with "calm and prudence", because the party was willing to give the government a year to prepare suffrage reform. Only Edmund Fischer, who was speaking in the Blumensale, clearly deviated from the position held by most of the leadership. His remarks sparked such a fire of indignation over police actions during the 3 December demonstrations that the police officer supervising the meeting threatened to break it up. Fischer exclaimed at one point, "We want to achieve our goal within the realm of legality, and if this is denied us, we have no other choice but to enter the realm of illegality." 52 While two weeks before the decision to hold street demonstrations had found majority but not unanimous support within the Social Democratic leadership,.apparently the same was now true for the decision not to hold any.
A small portion of the audience also did not want to go home once the meetings adjourned at eleven o'clock on the sixteenth. 53 Whereas the crowds quickly dispersed at most of the meeting places, 54 the audience in Lobtau lingered outside the meeting hall for a while despite the darkness and the rainy weather; they sang and cheered for equal suffrage. At the request of the local party leaders and on order of the police, this crowd also finally began to disperse. At the Trianon, where Gradnauer had been speaking that evening, there were objections from the crowd to his appeal not to demonstrate. After the rally, a crowd of people marched off in the direction of the city center just as demonstrators had done two weeks before. Unlike the 3 December march, however, this group lacked any strong leadership. "At Postplatz some called out, 'go left to the palace!' while others cried, 'go right to Metzsch!' The crowd seemed at first to waver." 55 In the end, it split into two. The group marching toward SchloPplatz found the entry to the square barricaded by police, so it turned around and followed the other group on its march to the villa of Minister Metzsch.
Near the Blumensale, another group of about four hundred people gathered and also marched off in the direction of the city center.
56 At first, these marchers were able to cross the Alleenring unimpeded. Not until they reached the police headquarters on Zeughausplatz were they pitted against the police. According to the police report, "individual police officers, who were violently assaulted, were forced to protect themselves by drawing their swords". The demonstrators were forced back across the Alleenring. There "they positioned themselves in groups on the corners of Pillnitzer and Amalienstrape and yelled curses and obscenities at the police forming a cordon across Amalienplatz". 57 Next they moved south along the Alleenring without being stopped by the police until they finally met the group from the Trianon in Wienerstrape. 51 The following is also based on the articles appearing in the SAZ and the DA on 18 December, as well as on the police report of 21 December 1905 (HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, ff. 72-74). M I am not familiar with any source material supporting Herrmann's contention that "following the meetings in the new town, there were protest marches that were halted by police on the bridges crossing the Elbe"; "Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrecht in Sachsen", p. 873. 55 DA, 18 December 1905. 56 There is no evidence that this group marched "singing the Socialist March with fists held high", as DOrrer describes: Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, p. 59. " The crowd was calling out names like "bloodhounds" and "Cossacks", SAZ, 18 December 1905. It reflects the manner in which DOrrer handles his sources when he describes the events by stating that "the workers did not think about giving up one inch to the police" and had gathered "again and again" on the corners of the square to hold "rallies": Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, pp. 59-60.
Just how well these data reflect the composition of the great mass of demonstrators is an open question, for we are talking here about only a minute fraction of the participants. Even the police chief did not rule out the possibility that several of those injured were people "who had been pulled into the throng although they had no intention to demonstrate". 69 In the days that followed the demonstration, many citizens sent letters to their newspapers complaining that they had landed unintentionally in the demonstration procession while on their way home from restaurants and pubs on that Saturday evening.
For this reason if no other, estimates of the number of demonstrators need to be taken with a grain of salt. In addition, the numbers appear to grow the further in time and distance one gets from the event. The account published on 19 December in the Social Democratic party organ Vorwdrts in Berlin spoke of 4,000 people. The final report of the Dresden police chief, dated two days later, referred to "several thousand persons". 70 The first edition of the SddisiscHe Arbeiterzeitung to appear after the demonstrations, on 18 December, estimated the number of those participating in the wildcat demonstrations to be about 1,000 from the Trianon and an additional 400 from the BlumensSle. In an article appearing the same day, the Dresdner Anzeiger reported at one point that "several thousand" people were in the streets. Despite these differences, all newspaper accounts did concur that the street demonstrations followed only the rallies at the Trianon and the BlumensSle. Each of the meeting halls could hold about 2,000 people. These crowds were augmented by another source of potential demonstrators, namely the "hundreds" of those who found no room in the halls and lingered outside. But both the Sa'clisische Arbeiterzeitung and the Dresdner Anzeiger reported that only "about four hundred" and "several hundreds", respectively, marched toward the city center from the Blumensale and that only part of the audience at the Trianon headed in the same direction. 71 For this reason, the total number of demonstrators could hardly have exceeded 2,000 once the two processions met in front of the villa of Minister Metzsch in WienerstraPe. 72 This corresponds roughly with the total size of the crowd that had battled with police two weeks before on the Augustus Bridge and in Pirnaischer and Schlopplatz. Now it is most important to compare this crowd with the total number of demonstrators. It must not be forgotten that there were at least another 25,000 people who assembled on 3 December to demonstrate 206 Christoph Nonn non-violently for equal suffrage. Seen this way, the radical militants who clashed with police were only a small minority.
VI
In recounting the events surrounding the Dresden suffrage demonstrations of December 1905, there thus appears to be little to substantiate the assumption that a radical grass-roots and* a reformist Social Democratic leadership were opposing one another in the Saxon capital. The events preceding and during the demonstration on 3 December leave almost no doubt that the demonstration had been approved and most likely organized by the local agitational committee. Apparently the leadership in Dresden, as well, as the party's executive committee in Berlin, viewed illegal street demonstrations as an opportunity to test the radicalism of the grass-roots with respect to the feasibility of political strikes. If the Social Democrats at first denied organizing the demonstration outdoors then it was for a good reason; they wanted to avoid legal prosecution.
As the majority of Dresden's Social Democratic leadership then switched to opposing a continuation of illegal actions such as street demonstrations and political strikes, the reason was not only that they wanted to give the government time to fulfill its reform promises. The party's leaders had actually come to this decision several days before the government issued its proclamation in the Saxon diet; the decision was a result of the conclusions drawn from the events of the 3 December demonstrations. This day had shown, for one, that the security forces were not bluffing when they threatened to prevent the outlawed demonstration in the center of political power by any means. A continuation of street demonstrations thus had become a very risky business, while the new stance of the liberals meant that a major aim had already been achieved. For another it had become obvious that the demonstrators exhibited a significant amount of civil courage, but shrank from using armed violence for the most part. These revelations opened up new roads of action, but they also eliminated the option of effectively using a political mass strike as a means of pressuring the government. Since such a strike would have meant involving public arenas like the transportation sector, in light of the government's reaction it was no longer conceivable without violence on a large scale, and in light of the crowd's behavior it would then have been without success. On 8 December, the Berlin SPD executive committee in a secret session agreed that a political mass strike was "currently unfeasible". The Dresden party leadership announced the same statement in the Sdchsische Arbeiterzeitung. From this point on, the majority of the Social Democratic elite in Dresden advised against continuing street demonstrations, which were usually mentioned in the same breath with the mass strike. And most of the party's constituency agreed. Just a small militant minority, of which only a small fraction belonged to the organized workers' movement, still sought confrontation with the police. There were no massive differences between the leaders and their followers, and the Saxon party leadership also did not steer "the rest of the movement onto a 'peaceful,' 'legal' course against the will of the workers". 74 This would not have been possible anyway because the SPD was neither a Leninist-like cadre party nor a reflection of the authoritarian Wilhelminian society in which it existed. Earlier in 1905, following grass-roots pressure, Dresden Social Democrats had in fact made a step toward further democratization of their organization by abolishing the Interne, an informal group of leaders that had originated during the party's persecution under the Socialist Laws and had planned many party issues internally and doctored resolutions then presented to the membership. 75 Now it was precisely the behavior of the party's constituency during the suffrage demonstrations on 3 December that showed the Social Democratic elite of the Saxon metropolis that it had no choice but to abandon all experimentation with radical and revolutionary tactics and to concentrate on a reformist course.
To what degree can these attained insights into radicalism, reformism and the relationship between grass-roots and elite in Dresden be generalized? For one, they shed new light on the events of the Hamburg suffrage demonstration of 17 January 1906, which Richard Evans has described. Although many of Evans' observations are accurate and valuable, closer scrutiny raises serious doubts about his central thesis on the existence of a large and growing "potential for militancy" at the grass-roots level, with which the party elite was losing touch increasingly. His account of the events pertaining to the demonstration indicates that the situation in the Hanseatic city actually was not considerably different from that in the Saxon metropolis. In Hamburg as in Dresden, it was the middle level of SPD activists that apparently organized and supervised the mass demonstrations taking place in the streets of the city AdsD, NL Quarck, no. 5) in which he states that Austria is no model for the suffrage struggle in Germany since the Austrian state is much weaker, and in a diary entry by Molkenbuhr, dated 10 March 1906, on the same topic (AdsD, Molkenbuhr papers IV), the "masses" had shown "that actually they do not want any violence". Also of interest is the police protocol of a discussion in the local SPD organization in Zwickau from 6 December 1905 (HStAD, PolizeiprSsidium Zwickau, no. 1305), in which the local party elite discussed the Dresden "suffrage battle" in connection with the issue of a mass strike and concluded that a great deal of preparation would still be necessary for such a strike to be successful. 74 This is the central thesis of Herrmann, "Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrccht in Sachsen"; quote in ibid., p. 876. 75 Sec Georg Lange, "Das Ende der Dresdner Interne," Sdcltsische Zeitung, 22 May 1954.
